તાત્કાલિક/અગત્યનું



ર્ડા.પ્રકાશ વાઘેલા અધિક નિયામક (જાહેર આરોગ્ય) <u>નં.ઇપીસી-૨૧/કોરોના વાયરસ/સૂચનાઓ /બાબત</u> /બ.૨૦ / 3૨૧૦ – ૩૨૨૦ કમિશ્નિરુશી,આરોગ્ય,તબીબી એવાઓ અને તબીબી શિક્ષણ (આ.વિ.)બ્લોક નં. ૫, ડૉ.છવરાજ મંદેતા ભવન, ગાંધીનગર. તા. **૦૧**.03.૨૦૨૦

વિષય:- નોવેલ કોરોના વાયરસ-૨૦૧૯(COVID-19)અન્વચે રોગ અટકાયતી પગલાં લેવા બાબત.

આપ સુવિદિત છો તેમ ઠાલ વિશ્વમાં ચીન સઠિત ૭૫ જેટલા દેશોમાં નોવેલ કોરોના વાચરસ-૨૦૧૯(COVID-19) ના ૯૦,૦૦૦ થી વધુ કેસ અને ૩,૦૦૦ થી વધુ મરણ નોંધાયેલ છે. વિશ્વ આરોગ્ય સંસ્થાએ આ રોગને પબ્લીક ઠેલ્થ ઇમરજન્સી ઓફ્ર ઇન્ટરનેશનલ કન્સર્ન જોઠર કરેલ છે. ભારતમાં પણ આ રોગના કુલ- ૩૦ કેસ નોંધાવા પામેલ છે. ગુજરાતમાં આ રોગનો એક પણ કન્ફ્ર્મ કેસ નોંધાયેલ નથી. આ રોગના લક્ષણોમાં ભારે તાવ, કક્ર, શરુદી, શ્વાસ લેવામાં તકલીફ્ર વગેરે જેવા મળે છે. આ લક્ષણો એક્યુટ રેસ્પીરેટરી ઇન્ફ્રેકશન કે ઇન્ફ્ર્લુએન્ઝા લાઈક ઈલનેસને મળતાં ઠોઈ આ રોગનો ફેલાવો ઝડપથી થાય છે.

રાજ્યમાં આ રોગનો ફેલાવો ન થાય તેમજ આ રોગના કારણે થતી ખુવારી અટકાવી શકાય તે માટે નીચે મુજબનારોગ અટકાયતી પગલાં લેવામાં આવી રહ્યા છે.

- જિહ્વા કક્ષાએ કલેકટરશી અને કોર્પોરેશન કક્ષાએ મ્યુનિસિપલ કમિશ્વરને કોરોના વાયરસ કન્ટેન્મેન્ટ માટે નોડલ ઓદ્વિસર નિમવામાં આવ્યા છે.
- જિહ્વા/કોર્પોરેશનમાં આવેલ તમામ અરકારી અને ખાનગી હોસ્પિટલોનું મેપીંગ કરી આ તમામ હોસ્પિટલોમાં આઈઓલેશન વોર્ડ શરુ કરવામાં આવ્યા છે.
- જિલ્લા/કોર્પોરેશન કક્ષાએર xy કંટ્રોલ રૂમ શરુ કરવામાં આવ્યો છે. તથા ૧૦૪ દેલ્પલાઇન નંબર પર કોરોના વાયરસ અને તેને લગત તમામ માદિતી ઉપલબ્ધ કરાવવામાં આવી છે.
- એરપોર્ટ, ઈમિગ્રેશન અને આરોગ્ય વિભાગ તરફથી આપવામાં આવતી યાદી પૈકીના મુસાફરોનું ફોલોઅપ આરોગ્યનીટીમો દ્ધારા કરવામાં આવી રહ્યું છે.

આ તબકકે આપના તરફથી પણ સુચિત કાર્યવાઠી કરી સરકારને અને જનસમુદાયને મદદરૂપ થવા વિનંતી છે. જેથી આપણે સૌ સાથે મળી આ રોગના કારણે થતી ખુવારી અટકાવી શકીએ.

• ઠોરિપટલમાં આવતાં તમામ દર્દીઓને આ રોગ અંગે માઠિતગાર કરશો અને તેનાથી

અભિવાદન કરવું, ગમે ત્યાં થુકવું નઠિ, કહ્વ-એટીકેટ,અંગત રુવચ્છતા અને ભીડભાડવાળી જગ્યાએ જવાનું ટાળવું અંગે આરોગ્ય શિક્ષણ આપશો.

- ઠોરિ-પટલોમાં ર-વચ્છતાનું ઉંચું ધોરણ જળવાય અને ઇન્દ્રેકશન કંટ્રોલ માટે જરૂરી આવચેતી લેવાય.
- આ સાથે સામેલ માર્ગદર્શીકા અનુસાર બે કોઇ પણ શંકારુપદ દર્દી જણાચ તો તાત્કાલિક બે આપની ઠોરિપટલ સામેલ માર્ગદર્શીકા અનુસાર દર્દીને દાખલ કરવા સક્ષમ ઠોચ તો તાત્કાલિક આપને ત્યાં દાખલ કરી જરૂરી સારવાર કરશો અન્યથા મુખ્ય છલ્લા આરોગ્ય અધિકારીનો સંપર્ક સાધશો.
- રાજચની તમામ ઠોસ્પિટલો આ રોગચાળાની પરિસ્થિતિમાં સરકારની સાથે રઠી પોતાના ત્યાં આવા દર્દીઓની સારવારની વ્યવસ્થા ઉભી કરે તે ઇચ્છનીય છે.

ઉક્ત બાબતે આપની કક્ષાએથી તમામ ઠોસિપટલોમાં માઠિતી પઠોંચાડવા વિનંતી છે. બિડાણ :- માર્ગદર્શીકા

NA SN

પ્રતિ

પ્રમુખશ્રી


ઇન્ડિચન મેડીકલ એઓશીચેશન ગુજરાત

નકલ સવિનય સ્વાના:-

- ♦ અંગત સચિવશ્રી, માન. મુખ્યમંત્રીશ્રી, રુવર્ણિમ સંકુલ-૧, ગાંધીનગર.
- ♦ અંગત અચિવશ્રી,માન. નાચબ મુખ્યમંત્રીશ્રી, રુવર્ણિમ સંકુલ-૧, ગાંધીનગર.
- ♦ અંગત અચિવશ્રી, માન. આરોગ્યમંત્રીશ્રી, (રા.ક) રુવર્ણિમ સંકુલ÷ર, ગાંધીનગર
- ♦ અગ્ર અચિવશ્રી, આરોગ્ય અને પરિવાર કલ્યાણ વિભાગ, ગાંધીનગર.
- કમિશ્વરશ્રી, આરોગ્ચ, તબીબી સેવાઓ અને તબીબી સિક્ષણ, ગાંધીનગર બકલરવાના:-
- 🛠 અધિક નિચામકશ્રી, તબીબી એવાઓ, ગાંધીનગર.
- 🛠 અધિક નિયામકશ્રી, તબીબી શિક્ષણ, ગાંધીનગર.
- 💠 વિભાગીચ નાચબ નિચામકશ્રી, તમામ
- મુખ્ય છલ્લા આરોગ્ય અધિકારીશ્રી, છલ્લા પંચાયત તમામ બણ તેમજ આપના છલ્લામાં આવેલ તમામ ખાનગી ઠોસ્પિટલો જયાં ઉકત સારવાર ઉપલબ્ધ થઇ શકે તેમ ઠોઇ તેની વિગતો તૈયાર કરવા અને આ વિગતો અત્રેની એપેડેમીક શાખામાં પાઠવી આપવા સારૂ.

Discharge Policy of nCoV Case

Clinical samples of any suspect/probable case* of nCOV will be sent for laboratory confirmation to designated laboratories. The case will be kept in isolation at health facility till the time of receipt of laboratory results and given symptomatic treatment as per existing guidelines. If the laboratory results for nCOV are negative, the discharge of such patients will be governed by his provisional/confirmed diagnosis and it is up to the treating physician to take a decision. The case shall still be monitored for 14 days after their last contact with a confirmed 2019-nCoV case. In case the laboratory results are positive for nCOV, the case shall be managed as per the confirmed case management protocol. The case shall be discharged only after evidence of chest radiographic clearance and viral clearance in respiratory samples after twospecimens test negative for nCOV within a period of 24 hours.



Case Classification*

Suspect case

A. Patients with severe acute respiratory infection (fever, cough, and requiring admission to hospital), <u>AND</u> with no other etiology that fully explains the clinical presentation <u>AND</u> at least one of the following:

- a history of travel to or residence in the city of Wuhan, Hubei Province, China in the 14 days prior to symptom onset, or
- patient is a health care worker who has been working in an environment where severe acute respiratory infections of unknown etiology are being cared for.

B. Patients with any acute respiratory illness <u>AND</u> at least one of the following:

- close contact with a confirmed or probable case of 2019-nCoV in the 14 days prior to illness onset, or
- visiting or working in a live animal market in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China in the 14 days prior to symptom onset, or
- worked or attended a health care facility in the 14 days prior to onset of symptoms where patients with hospital-associated 2019-nCov infections have been reported.

Probable case

Probable case: A suspect case for whom testing for 2019-nCoV is inconclusive or for whom testing was positive on a pan-coronavirus assay.

Confirmed case

A person with laboratory confirmation of 2019-nCoV infection, irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms.

(Source: WHO: https://www.who.int/publications-detail/global-surveillance-for-human-infectionwith-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)) National Centre for Disease Control Directorate General of Health Services MoHFW, GOI, New Delhi

The updated case definitions and contact-categorisation

It has been observed that WHO has recently updated the case definitions based on the current information available and will be revised as new information accumulates. India may also need to adapt case definitions depending on current epidemiological situation. Based on the available information on COVID-19, the following case definitions are put forth for approval:

Suspect Case: A patient with acute respiratory illness {fever and at least one sign/symptom of respiratory disease (e.g., cough, shortness of breath)}, **AND** a history of travel to or residence in a country/area or territory reporting local transmission (See NCDC website for updated list) of COVID-19 disease during the 14 days prior to symptom onset;

OR A patient/Health care worker with any acute respiratory illness **AND** having been in *contact* with a confirmed COVID-19 case in the last 14 days prior to onset of symptoms;

OR A patient with severe acute respiratory infection {fever and at least one sign/symptom of respiratory disease (e.g., cough, shortness breath)} **AND** requiring hospitalization **AND** with no other etiology that fully explains the clinical presentation; **OR** A case for whom testing for COVID-19 is inconclusive.

Laboratory Confirmed case: A person with laboratory confirmation of COVID-19 infection, irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms.

Updated definition of contact: A contact is a person that is

involved in any of the following:

• Providing direct care without proper personal protective equipment (PPE) for COVID-19 patients

• Staying in the same close environment of a COVID-19 patient (including workplace, classroom, household, gatherings).

• Traveling together in close proximity (1 m) with a symptomatic person who later tested positive for COVID-19.

High Risk Contact:

• Touched body fluids of the patient (Respiratory tract secretions, blood, vomit, saliva, urine, faeces)

• Had direct physical contact with the body of the patient including physical examination without PPE.

• Touched or cleaned the linens, clothes, or dishes of the patient.

• Lives in the same household as the patient.

• Anyone in close proximity (within 3 ft) of the confirmed case without precautions.

• Passenger in close proximity (within 3 ft) of a conveyance with a symptomatic person who later tested positive for COVID-19 for more than 6 hours.

Low Risk Contact:

• Shared the same space (Same class for school/worked in same room/similar and not having a high risk exposure to confirmed or suspect case of COVID-19).

• Travelled in same environment (bus/train/flight/any mode of transit) but not having a high-risk exposure.

Guidelines on Clinical management of severe acute respiratory illness (SARI) in suspect/confirmed novel coronavirus (nCoV) cases

An infection with a novel coronavirus has been reported from China. As 25th January 2020, a total of 1287 cases and 41 deaths were reported in 29 provinces (districts and cities) of China. In addition, 28 cases have been confirmed outside Chinese mainland: 5 cases in Hong Kong, 2 cases in Macao, 3 cases in Taiwan, 4 cases in Thailand (2 cases cured), 2 cases in Japan (1 case cured), 2 cases in South Korea, 2 cases in the United States, 2 cases in Vietnam, 3 cases in Singapore, 1 case in Nepal and 2 cases in France.

Purpose and scope of document

This document is intended for clinicians taking care of hospitalised adult and paediatric patients with severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) when an nCoV infection is suspected. It is not meant to replace clinical judgment or specialist consultation but rather to strengthen clinical management of these patients and provide to up-to-date guidance. Best practices for SARI including IPC and optimized supportive care for severely ill patients are essential.

This document aims to provide clinicians with updated interim guidance on timely, effective, and safe supportive management of patients with nCoV and SARI, particularly those with critical illness. The recommendations in this document are derived from WHO publications.

A. Triage: Early recognition of patients with SARI associated with nCoV infection.

The purpose of triage is to recognize and sort all patients with SARI at first point of contact with health care system (such as the emergency department). Consider nCOV as a possible etiology of SARI under certain conditions (see Table 1). Triage patients and start emergency treatments based based on disease severity.

SARI	An ARI with history of fever or measured temperature \geq 38 C° and cough; onset within the last ~10 days; and requiring hospitalization. However, the absence of fever does NOT exclude viral infection.			
Surveillance case definitions for nCoV*	1. Severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) in a person, with history of fever and cough requiring admission to hospital, with no other etiology that fully explains the clinical presentation ¹ (clinicians should also be alert to the possibility of atypical presentations in patients who are immunocompromised);			
	 AND any of the following: a) A history of travel to Wuhan, Hubei Province China in the 14 days prior to symptom onset; or b) the disease occurs in a health care worker who has been working in an environment where patients with severe acute respiratory infections are being cared for, without regard to place of residence or history of travel; or c) the person develops an unusual or unexpected clinical course, especially sudden deterioration despite appropriate treatment, without regard to place of residence or history of travel, even if another etiology has been identified that fully explains the clinical presentation 			
	2. A person with acute respiratory illness of any degree of severity who,			

Table 1: Definitions of patients with SARI, suspected of nCoV*

within	14 days before onset of illness, had any of the following
exposu	res:
a)	close physical contact ² with a confirmed case of nCoV infection, while that patient was symptomatic; or
b)	a healthcare facility in a country where hospital-associated nCoV infections have been reported;

* see https://mohfw.gov.in/media/disease-alerts for latest case definition

1- Testing should be according to local guidance for management of community-acquired pneumonia. Examples of other etiologies include Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenza type B, Legionella pneumophila, other recognized primary bacterial pneumonias, influenza viruses, and respiratory syncytial virus.

2- Close contact is defined as:

- Health care associated exposure, including providing direct care for nCoV patients, working with health care workers infected with nCoV, visiting patients or staying in the same close environment of a nCoV patient
- Working together in close proximity or sharing the same classroom environment with a with nCoV patient
- Traveling together with nCoV patient in any kind of conveyance
- Living in the same household as a nCoV patient

The epidemiological link may have occurred within a 14-day period before or after the onset of illness in the case under consideration

Novel Coronavirus may present with mild, moderate, or severe illness; the latter includes severe pneumonia, ARDS, sepsis and septic shock. Early recognition of suspected patients allows for timely initiation of IPC (see Table 2). Early identification of those with severe manifestations (see Table 2) allows for immediate optimized supportive care treatments and safe, rapid admission (or referral) to intensive care unit according to institutional or national protocols. For those with mild illness, hospitalization may not be required unless there is concern for rapid deterioration. All patients discharged home should be instructed to return to hospital if they develop any worsening of illness.

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Uncomplicated	Patients with uncomplicated upper respiratory tract viral infection, may have non-
illness	specific symptoms such as fever, cough, sore throat, nasal congestion, malaise,
	headache, muscle pain or malaise. The elderly and immunosuppressed may present
	with atypical symptoms. These patients do not have any signs of dehydration,
	sepsis or shortness of breath
Mild	Patient with pneumonia and no signs of severe pneumonia.
pneumonia	Child with non-severe pneumonia has cough or difficulty breathing + fast
_	breathing: fast breathing (in breaths/min): <2 months, ≥ 60 ; 2–11 months, ≥ 50 ; 1–5
	years, ≥ 40 and no signs of severe pneumonia
Severe	Adolescent or adult: fever or suspected respiratory infection, plus one of
pneumonia	respiratory rate >30 breaths/min, severe respiratory distress, or SpO2 <90% on
	room air
	Child with cough or difficulty in breathing, plus at least one of the following:
	central cyanosis or SpO2 <90%; severe respiratory distress (e.g. grunting, very
	severe chest indrawing); signs of pneumonia with a general danger sign: inability
	to breastfeed or drink, lethargy or unconsciousness, or convulsions. Other signs of
	pneumonia may be present: chest indrawing, fast breathing (in breaths/min): <2
	months, ≥ 60 ; 2–11 months, ≥ 50 ; 1–5 years, ≥ 40 . The diagnosis is clinical; chest
	imaging can exclude complications.
Acute	Onset : new or worsening respiratory symptoms within one week of known clinical
Respiratory	insult.
Distress	Chest imaging (radiograph, CT scan, or lung ultrasound): bilateral opacities,
Syndrome	not fully explained by effusions, lobar or lung collapse, or nodules.

Table 2: Clinical syndromes associa	ted with nCoV infection
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	Origin of oedema: respiratory failure not fully explained by cardiac failure or fluid overload. Need objective assessment (e.g. echocardiography) to exclude hydrostatic cause of oedema if no risk factor present. Oxygenation (adults):
	• Mild ARDS: 200 mmHg < PaO2/FiO2 ≤ 300 mmHg (with PEEP or CPAP ≥5 cm H ₂ O, or non-ventilated)
	• Moderate ARDS: 100 mmHg < PaO2/FiO2 ≤200 mmHg with PEEP ≥5 cm H ₂ O, or non-ventilated)
	• Severe ARDS: PaO2/FiO2 ≤ 100 mmHg with PEEP ≥5 cmH2O, or non-ventilated)
	• When PaO ₂ is not available, SpO ₂ /FiO ₂ ≤315 suggests ARDS (including in non-ventilated patients)
	Oxygenation (children; note $OI = Oxygenation$ Index and $OSI = Oxygenation$ Index using SpO_2)
	 Bilevel NIV or CPAP ≥5 cmH2O via full face mask: PaO₂/FiO₂ ≤ 300 mmHg or SpO₂/FiO₂ ≤264
	 Mild ARDS (invasively ventilated): 4 ≤ OI < 8 or 5 ≤ OSI < 7.5 Moderate ARDS (invasively ventilated): 8 ≤ OI < 16 or 7.5 ≤ OSI < 12.3
	• Severe ARDS (invasively ventilated): $OI \ge 16$ or $OSI \ge 12.3$
Sepsis	 Adults: life-threatening organ dysfunction caused by a dysregulated host response to suspected or proven infection, with organ dysfunction. Signs of organ dysfunction include: altered mental status, difficult or fast breathing, low oxygen saturation, reduced urine output, fast heart rate, weak pulse, cold extremities or low blood pressure, skin mottling, or laboratory evidence of coagulopathy, thrombocytopenia, acidosis, high lactate or hyperbilirubinemia. Children: suspected or proven infection and ≥2 SIRS criteria, of which one must be abnormal temperature or white blood cell count
Septic shock	Adults: persisting hypotension despite volume resuscitation, requiring vasopressors to maintain MAP \geq 65 mmHg and serum lactate level \geq 2 mmol/L Children: any hypotension (SBP <5th centile or \geq 2 SD below normal for age) or 2-3 of the following: altered mental state; tachycardia or bradycardia (HR <90 bpm or \geq 160 bpm in infants and HR <70 bpm or \geq 150 bpm in children); prolonged capillary refill (\geq 2 sec) or warm vasodilation with bounding pulses; tachypnea; mottled skin or petechial or purpuric rash; increased lactate; oliguria; hyperthermia or hypothermia

B. Immediate implementation of appropriate IPC measures

IPC is a critical and integral part of clinical management of patients and should be initiated at the point of entry of the patient to hospital (typically the Emergency Department). Standard precautions should always be routinely applied in all areas of health care facilities. Standard precautions include hand hygiene; use of PPE to avoid direct contact with patients' blood, body fluids, secretions (including respiratory secretions) and non-intact skin. Standard precautions also include prevention of needle-stick or sharps injury; safe waste management; cleaning and disinfection of equipment; and cleaning of the environment.

Table 3: How to implement infection prevention and control measures for patients with suspected or confirmed nCoV infection

At triage	• Give suspect patient a medical mask and direct patient to separate area, an					
	isolation room if available. Keep at least 1 meter distance between suspected					
	patients and other patients. Instruct all patients to cover nose and mouth					
	during coughing or sneezing with tissue or flexed elbow for others. Perform					

hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions
 Droplet precautions prevent large droplet transmission of respiratory viruses.
Use a medical mask if working within 1-2 metres of the patient. Place patients in single rooms, or group together those with the same etiological diagnosis. If an etiological diagnosis is not possible, group patients with similar clinical diagnosis and based on epidemiological risk factors, with a spatial separation. When providing care in close contact with a patient with respiratory symptoms (e.g. coughing or sneezing), use eye protection (face-mask or goggles), because sprays of secretions may occur. Limit patient movement within the institution and ensure that patients wear medical masks when outside their rooms
• Droplet and contact precautions prevent direct or indirect transmission from contact with contaminated surfaces or equipment (i.e. contact with contaminated oxygen tubing/interfaces). Use PPE (medical mask, eye protection, gloves and gown) when entering room and remove PPE when leaving. If possible, use either disposable or dedicated equipment (e.g. stethoscopes, blood pressure cuffs and thermometers). If equipment needs to be shared among patients, clean and disinfect between each patient use. Ensure that health care workers refrain from touching their eyes, nose, and mouth with potentially contaminated gloved or ungloved hands. Avoid contaminating environmental surfaces that are not directly related to patient care (e.g. door handles and light switches). Ensure adequate room ventilation. Avoid movement of patients or transport. Perform hand hygiene
• Ensure that healthcare workers performing aerosol-generating procedures (i.e. open suctioning of respiratory tract, intubation, bronchoscopy, cardiopulmonary resuscitation) use PPE, including gloves, long-sleeved gowns, eye protection, and fit-tested particulate respirators (N95 or equivalent, or higher level of protection). (The scheduled fit test should not be confused with user seal check before each use.) Whenever possible, use adequately ventilated single rooms when performing aerosol-generating procedures, meaning negative pressure rooms with minimum of 12 air changes per hour or at least 160 litres/second/patient in facilities with natural ventilation. Avoid the presence of unnecessary individuals in the room. Care for the patient in the same type of room after mechanical ventilation commences

Abbreviations: ARI, acute respiratory infection; PPE, personal protective equipment

C. Early supportive therapy and monitoring

- a. Give supplemental oxygen therapy immediately to patients with SARI and respiratory distress, hypoxaemia, or shock: Initiate oxygen therapy at 5 L/min and titrate flow rates to reach target $SpO_2 \ge 90\%$ in non-pregnant adults and $SpO_2 \ge 92-95\%$ in pregnant patients. Children with emergency signs (obstructed or absent breathing, severe respiratory distress, central cyanosis, shock, coma or convulsions) should receive oxygen therapy during resuscitation to target $SpO_2 \ge 94\%$; otherwise, the target SpO_2 is $\ge 90\%$. All areas where patients with SARI are cared for should be equipped with pulse oximeters, functioning oxygen systems and disposable, single-use, oxygen-delivering interfaces (nasal cannula, simple face mask, and mask with reservoir bag). Use contact precautions when handling contaminated oxygen interfaces of patients with nCoV infection
- b. Use conservative fluid management in patients with SARI when there is no evidence of shock: Patients with SARI should be treated cautiously with intravenous fluids, because aggressive fluid

resuscitation may worsen oxygenation, especially in settings where there is limited availability of mechanical ventilation

- c. Give empiric antimicrobials to treat all likely pathogens causing SARI. Give antimicrobials within one hour of initial patient assessment for patients with sepsis: Although the patient may be suspected to have nCoV, administer appropriate empiric antimicrobials within ONE hour of identification of sepsis. Empiric antibiotic treatment should be based on the clinical diagnosis (community-acquired pneumonia, health care-associated pneumonia [if infection was acquired in healthcare setting], or sepsis), local epidemiology and susceptibility data, and treatment guidelines. Empiric therapy includes a neuraminidase inhibitor for treatment of influenza when there is local circulation or other risk factors, including travel history or exposure to animal influenza viruses.18 Empiric therapy should be de-escalated on the basis of microbiology results and clinical judgment
- d. Do not routinely give systemic corticosteroids for treatment of viral pneumonia or ARDS outside of clinical trials unless they are indicated for another reason: A systematic review of observational studies of corticosteroids administered to patients with SARS reported no survival benefit and possible harms (avascular necrosis, psychosis, diabetes, and delayed viral clearance). A systematic review of observational studies in influenza found a higher risk of mortality and secondary infections with corticosteroids; the evidence was judged as very low to low quality due to confounding by indication. A subsequent study that addressed this limitation by adjusting for time-varying confounders found no effect on mortality. Finally, a recent study of patients receiving corticosteroids for MERS used a similar statistical approach and found no effect of corticosteroids on mortality but delayed lower respiratory tract (LRT) clearance of MERS-CoV. Given lack of effectiveness and possible harm, routine corticosteroids should be avoided unless they are indicated for another reason. See section F for the use of corticosteroids in sepsis.
- e. Closely monitor patients with SARI for signs of clinical deterioration, such as rapidly progressive respiratory failure and sepsis, and apply supportive care interventions immediately: Application of timely, effective, and safe supportive therapies is the cornerstone of therapy for patients that develop severe manifestations of nCoV
- f. Understand the patient's co-morbid condition(s) to tailor the management of critical illness and appreciate the prognosis: During intensive care management of SARI, determine which chronic therapies should be continued and which therapies should be stopped temporarily
- g. Communicate early with patient and family: Communicate proactively with patients and families and provide support and prognostic information. Understand the patient's values and preferences regarding life-sustaining interventions

D. Collection of specimens for laboratory diagnosis

Guidance on specimen collection, processing, transportation, including related biosafety procedures, is available on <u>https://mohfw.gov.in/media/disease-alerts</u>

Points to remember

- Collect blood cultures for bacteria that cause pneumonia and sepsis, ideally before antimicrobial therapy. DO NOT delay antimicrobial therapy to collect blood cultures
- Collect specimens from BOTH the upper respiratory tract (URT; nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal) AND lower respiratory tract (LRT; expectorated sputum, endotracheal aspirate, or bronchoalveolar lavage) for nCoV testing by RT-PCR. Clinicians may elect to collect only LRT samples when these are readily available (for example, in mechanically ventilated patients)

• Use appropriate PPE for specimen collection (droplet and contact precautions for URT specimens; airborne precautions for LRT specimens). When collecting URT samples, use viral swabs (sterile Dacron or rayon, not cotton) and viral transport media. Do not sample the nostrils or tonsils. In a patient with suspected novel coronavirus, especially with pneumonia or severe illness, a single URT sample does not exclude the diagnosis, and additional URT and LRT samples are recommended. LRT (vs. URT) samples are more likely to be positive and for a longer period. Clinicians may elect to collect only LRT samples when these are readily available (for example, in mechanically ventilated patients). Sputum induction should be avoided due to increased risk of increasing aerosol transmission.

Dual infections with other respiratory viral infections have been found in SARS and MERS cases. At this stage we need detailed microbiologic studies in all suspected cases. Both URT and LRT specimens can tested for other respiratory viruses, such as influenza A and B (including zoonotic influenza A), respiratory syncytial virus, parainfluenza viruses, rhinoviruses, adenoviruses, enteroviruses (e.g. EVD68), human metapneumovirus, and endemic human coronaviruses (i.e. HKU1, OC43, NL63, and 229E). LRT specimens can also be tested for bacterial pathogens, including Legionella pneumophila

In hospitalized patients with confirmed nCoV infection, repeat URT and LRT samples should be collected to demonstrate viral clearance. The frequency of specimen collection will depend on local circumstances but should be at least every 2 to 4 days until there are two consecutive negative results (both URT and LRT samples if both are collected) in a clinically recovered patient at least 24 hours apart. If local infection control practice requires two negative results before removal of droplet precautions, specimens may be collected as often as daily

E. Management of hypoxemic respiratory failure and ARDS

Recognize severe hypoxemic respiratory failure when a patient with respiratory distress is failing standard oxygen therapy. Patients may continue to have increased work of breathing or hypoxemia even when oxygen is delivered via a face mask with reservoir bag (flow rates of 10-15 L/min, which is typically the minimum flow required to maintain bag inflation; FiO₂ 0.60-0.95). Hypoxemic respiratory failure in ARDS commonly results from intrapulmonary ventilation-perfusion mismatch or shunt and usually requires mechanical ventilation

High-flow nasal oxygen (HFNO) or non-invasive ventilation (NIV) should only be used in selected patients with hypoxemic respiratory failure. The risk of treatment failure is high in patients with MERS treated with NIV, and patients treated with either HFNO or NIV should be closely monitored for clinical deterioration. HFNO systems can deliver 60 L/min of gas flow and FiO₂ up to 1.0; paediatric circuits generally only handle up to 15 L/min, and many children will require an adult circuit to deliver adequate flow. Compared to standard oxygen therapy, HFNO reduces the need for intubation. Patients with hypercapnia (exacerbation of obstructive lung disease, cardiogenic pulmonary oedema), hemodynamic instability, multi-organ failure, or abnormal mental status should generally not receive HFNO, although emerging data suggest that HFNO may be safe in patients with mild-moderate and non-worsening hypercapnia.25 Patients receiving HFNO should be in a monitored setting and cared for by experienced personnel capable of endotracheal intubation in case the patient acutely deteriorates or does not improve after a short trial (about 1 hr). Evidence-based guidelines on HFNO do not exist, and reports on HFNO in MERS patients are limited.

NIV guidelines make no recommendation on use in hypoxemic respiratory failure (apart from cardiogenic pulmonary oedema and post-operative respiratory failure) or pandemic viral illness (referring to studies of SARS and pandemic influenza). Risks include delayed intubation, large tidal volumes, and injurious transpulmonary pressures. Limited data suggest a high failure rate when MERS patients receive NIV. Patients receiving a trial of NIV should be in a monitored setting and cared for by experienced personnel capable of endotracheal intubation in case the patient acutely deteriorates or does not improve after a short trial (about 1 hr). Patients with hemodynamic instability, multiorgan failure, or abnormal mental status should not receive NIV.

Recent publications suggest that newer HFNO and NIV systems with good interface fitting do not create widespread dispersion of exhaled air and therefore should be associated with low risk of airborne transmission.

Endotracheal intubation should be performed by a trained and experienced provider using airborne precautions. Patients with ARDS, especially young children or those who are obese or pregnant, may desaturate quickly during intubation. Pre-oxygenate with 100% FiO₂ for 5 minutes, via a face mask with reservoir bag, bag-valve mask, HFNO, or NIV. Rapid sequence intubation is appropriate after an airway assessment that identifies no signs of difficult intubation.

Implement mechanical ventilation using lower tidal volumes (4–8 ml/kg predicted body weight, PBW) and lower inspiratory pressures (plateau pressure <30 cmH₂O). This is a strong recommendation from a clinical guideline for patients with ARDS, and is suggested for patients with sepsis-induced respiratory failure who do not meet ARDS criteria. The initial tidal volume is 6 ml/kg PBW; tidal volume up to 8 ml/kg PBW is allowed if undesirable side effects occur (e.g. dyssynchrony, pH <7.15). Hypercapnia is permitted if meeting the pH goal of 7.30-7.45. Ventilator protocols are available. The use of deep sedation may be required to control respiratory drive and achieve tidal volume targets. Although high driving pressure (plateau pressure–PEEP) may more accurately predict increased mortality in ARDS compared to high tidal volume or plateau pressure, RCTs of ventilation strategies that target driving pressure are not currently available.

In patients with severe ARDS, prone ventilation for >12 hours per day is recommended. Application of prone ventilation is strongly recommended for adult and paediatric patients with severe ARDS but requires sufficient human resources and expertise to be performed safely.

Use a conservative fluid management strategy for ARDS patients without tissue hypoperfusion.

In patients with moderate or severe ARDS, higher PEEP instead of lower PEEP is suggested. PEEP titration requires consideration of benefits (reducing atelectrauma and improving alveolar recruitment) vs. risks (end-inspiratory overdistension leading to lung injury and higher pulmonary vascular resistance). Tables are available to guide PEEP titration based on the FiO₂ required to maintain SpO₂. A related intervention of recruitment manoeuvres (RMs) is delivered as episodic periods of high continuous positive airway pressure [30–40 cm H₂O], progressive incremental increases in PEEP with constant driving pressure, or high driving pressure; considerations of benefits vs. risks are similar. Higher PEEP and RMs were both conditionally recommended in a clinical practice guideline. For PEEP, the guideline considered an individual patient data meta-analysis of 3 RCTs. However, a subsequent RCT of high PEEP and prolonged high-pressure RMs showed harm, suggesting that the protocol in this RCT should be avoided. Monitoring of patients to identify those who respond to the

initial application of higher PEEP or a different RM protocol, and stopping these interventions in non-responders, is suggested.

In patients with moderate-severe ARDS ($PaO_2/FiO_2 < 150$), neuromuscular blockade by continuous infusion should not be routinely used. One trial found that this strategy improved survival in patients with severe ARDS ($PaO_2/FiO_2 < 150$) without causing significant weakness, but results of a recent larger trial found that use of neuromuscular blockage with high PEEP strategy was not associated with survival when compared to a light sedation strategy without neuromuscular blockade. Continuous neuromuscular blockade may still be considered in patients with ARDS in certain situations: ventilator dyssnchony despite sedation, such that tidal volume limitation cannot be reliably achieved; or refractory hypoxemia or hypercapnia.

In settings with access to expertise in extracorporeal life support (ECLS), consider referral of patients with refractory hypoxemia despite lung protective ventilation. A recent guideline made no recommendation about ECLS in patients with ARDS. Since then, an RCT of ECLS for patients with ARDS was stopped early and found no statistically significant difference in the primary outcome of 60-day mortality between ECLS and standard medical management (including prone positioning and neuromuscular blockade). However, ECLS was associated with a reduced risk of the composite outcome of mortality and crossover to ECLS, and a post hoc Bayesian analysis of this RCT showed that ECLS is very likely to reduce mortality across a range of prior assumptions. In patients with MERS-CoV infection, ECLS vs. conventional treatment was associated with reduced mortality in a cohort study. ECLS should only be offered in expert centres with a sufficient case volume to maintain expertise and that can apply the IPC measures required for nCoV patients

Avoid disconnecting the patient from the ventilator, which results in loss of PEEP and atelectasis. Use in-line catheters for airway suctioning and clamp endotracheal tube when disconnection is required (for example, transfer to a transport ventilator)

F. Management of septic shock

Recognize septic shock in adults when infection is suspected or confirmed AND vasopressors are needed to maintain mean arterial pressure (MAP) \geq 65 mmHg AND lactate is \geq 2 mmol/L, in absence of hypovolemia. Recognize septic shock in children with any hypotension (systolic blood pressure [SBP] <5th centile or >2 SD below normal for age) or 2-3 of the following: altered mental state; tachycardia or bradycardia (HR <90 bpm or >160 bpm in infants and HR <70 bpm or >150 bpm in children); prolonged capillary refill (>2 sec) or warm vasodilation with bounding pulses; tachypnea; mottled skin or petechial or purpuric rash; increased lactate; oliguria; hyperthermia or hypothermia.

In the absence of a lactate measurement, use MAP and clinical signs of perfusion to define shock. Standard care includes early recognition and the following treatments within 1 hour of recognition: antimicrobial therapy and fluid loading and vasopressors for hypotension. The use of central venous and arterial catheters should be based on resource availability and individual patient needs. Detailed guidelines are available for the management of septic shock in adults and children.

In resuscitation from septic shock in adults, give at least 30 ml/kg of isotonic crystalloid in adults in the first 3 hours. In resuscitation from septic shock in children in well-resourced settings, give 20 ml/kg as a rapid bolus and up to 40-60 ml/kg in the first 1 hr.

Do not use hypotonic crystalloids, starches, or gelatins for resuscitation.

Fluid resuscitation may lead to volume overload, including respiratory failure. If there is no response to fluid loading and signs of volume overload appear (for example, jugular venous distension, crackles on lung auscultation, pulmonary oedema on imaging, or hepatomegaly in children), then reduce or discontinue fluid administration. This step is particularly important where mechanical ventilation is not available. Alternate fluid regimens are suggested when caring for children in resource-limited settings.

Crystalloids include normal saline and Ringer's lactate. Determine need for additional fluid boluses (250-1000 ml in adults or 10-20 ml/kg in children) based on clinical response and improvement of perfusion targets. Perfusion targets include MAP (>65 mmHg or age-appropriate targets in children), urine output (>0.5 ml/kg/hr in adults, 1 ml/kg/hr in children), and improvement of skin mottling, capillary refill, level of consciousness, and lactate. Consider dynamic indices of volume responsiveness to guide volume administration beyond initial resuscitation based on local resources and experience. These indices include passive leg raises, fluid challenges with serial stroke volume measurements, or variations in systolic pressure, pulse pressure, inferior vena cava size, or stroke volume in response to changes in intrathoracic pressure during mechanical ventilation.

Starches are associated with an increased risk of death and acute kidney injury vs. crystalloids. The effects of gelatins are less clear, but they are more expensive than cyrstalloids. Hypotonic (vs. isotonic) solutions are less effective at increasing intravascular volume. Surviving Sepsis also suggests albumin for resuscitation when patients require substantial amounts of crystalloids, but this conditional recommendation is based on low-quality evidence.

Administer vasopressors when shock persists during or after fluid resuscitation. The initial blood pressure target is MAP \geq 65 mmHg in adults and age-appropriate targets in children.

If central venous catheters are not available, vasopressors can be given through a peripheral IV, but use a large vein and closely monitor for signs of extravasation and local tissue necrosis. If extravasation occurs, stop infusion. Vasopressors can also be administered through intraosseous needles.

If signs of poor perfusion and cardiac dysfunction persist despite achieving MAP target with fluids and vasopressors, consider an inotrope such as dobutamine

Vasopressors (i.e. norepinephrine, epinephrine, vasopressin, and dopamine) are most safely given through a central venous catheter at a strictly controlled rate, but it is also possible to safely administer them via peripheral vein and intraosseous needle. Monitor blood pressure frequently and titrate the vasopressor to the minimum dose necessary to maintain perfusion and prevent side effects. Norepinephrine is considered first-line in adult patients; epinephrine or vasopressin can be added to achieve the MAP target. Because of the risk of tachyarrhythmia, reserve dopamine for selected patients with low risk of tachyarrhythmia or those with bradycardia. In children with cold shock (more common), epinephrine is considered first-line, while norepinephrine is used in patients with warm shock (less common).

G. Prevention of complications

Implement the following interventions (Table 4) to prevent complications associated with critical illness. These interventions are based on Surviving Sepsis or other guidelines, and are generally limited to feasible recommendations based on high quality evidence.

Anticipated	Interventions
Outcome	
Reduce days of invasive mechanical ventilation	 Use weaning protocols that include daily assessment for readiness to breathe spontaneously Minimize continuous or intermittent sedation, targeting specific titration endpoints (light sedation unless contraindicated) or with daily interruption of continuous sedative infusions
Reduce incidence of ventilator associated pneumonia	 Oral intubation is preferable to nasal intubation in adolescents and adults Keep patient in semi-recumbent position (head of bed elevation 30-45°) Use a closed suctioning system; periodically drain and discard condensate in tubing Use a new ventilator circuit for each patient; once patient is ventilated, change circuit if it is soiled or damaged but not routinely Change heat moisture exchanger when it malfunctions, when soiled, or every 5–7 days
Reduce incidence of venous thromboembolism	• Use pharmacological prophylaxis (low molecular-weight heparin [preferred if available] or heparin 5000 units subcutaneously twice daily) in adolescents and adults without contraindications. For those with contraindications, use mechanical prophylaxis (intermittent pneumatic compression devices).
Reduce incidence of catheter related bloodstream infection	• Use a checklist with completion verified by a real-time observer as reminder of each step needed for sterile insertion and as a daily reminder to remove catheter if no longer needed
Reduce incidence of pressure ulcers	• Turn patient every two hours
Reduce incidence of stress ulcers and gastrointestinal bleeding	 Give early enteral nutrition (within 24–48 hours of admission) Administer histamine-2 receptor blockers or proton-pump inhibitors in patients with risk factors for GI bleeding. Risk factors for gastrointestinal bleeding include mechanical ventilation for ≥48 hours, coagulopathy, renal replacement therapy, liver disease, multiple comorbidities, and higher organ failure score
Reduce incidence of ICU-related weakness	• Actively mobilize the patient early in the course of illness when safe to do so

 Table 4: Prevention of complications

H. Specific anti-Novel-CoV treatments and clinical research

There is no current evidence from RCTs to recommend any specific anti-nCoV treatment for patients with suspected or confirmed nCoV. Unlicensed treatments should be administered only in the context of ethically-approved clinical trials or the Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered Interventions Framework (MEURI), with strict monitoring.

Clinical characterization protocols are available, including the SPRINT-SARI https://isaric.tghn.org/sprint-sari/ and WHOISARIC forms available at https://isaric.tghn.org/protocols/severe-acute-respiratory-infection-data-tools/.

I. Special considerations for pregnant patients

Pregnant women with suspected or confirmed nCoV should be treated with supportive therapies as described above, taking into account the physiologic adaptations of pregnancy.

The use of investigational therapeutic agents outside of a research study should be guided by individual risk-benefit analysis based on potential benefit for mother and safety to fetus, with consultation from an obstetric specialist and ethics committee.

Emergency delivery and pregnancy termination decisions are challenging and based on many factors: gestational age, maternal condition, and fetal stability. Consultations with obstetric, neonatal, and intensive care specialists (depending on the condition of the mother) are essential.

Note: These guidelines are preliminary in nature and will be updated as soon as more information on clinical profile and treatment are available.



Specimen Collection, Packaging and Transport Guidelines for 2019 novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)

Title: Specimen Collection, Packaging and Transport Guidelines for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)

SOP number: ICMR-NIV/2019-nCoV/Specimens_01Prepared by: Dr. Y.K. GuravDate: 19/01/2020Reviewed by: Dr. V. PotdarDate: 20/01/2020Approved by: Dr. P. AbrahamDate: 20/01/2020

Scope:

To be used by the Government health authorities/ hospitals/ clinicians/ laboratories planning to collect appropriate clinical samples as indicated for diagnosis of 2019-nCoV.

Purpose:

This document describes the information for collection, packaging and transport of clinical specimens to Influenza group at ICMR-National Institute of Virology (NIV), Pune, Maharashtra for diagnosis of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019nCoV)

Responsibilities:

- The clinician should decide necessity for collection of clinical specimens for laboratory testing of 2019-nCoV only after following the case definition as given by the health authorities, Government of India.
- Appropriate clinical sample need to be collected by laboratory personnel/ health care worker trained in specimen collection in presence of a clinician.
- By following all biosafety precautions and using personal protective equipment (PPEs), clinical samples need to be sent to the designated laboratory (ICMR-NIV, Pune) by following standard triple packaging.

Selection of patient:

Any person who presents with Severe Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI) AND any one of the following i.e. a history of travel from Wuhan, China in 14 days prior to symptoms onset; disease in healthcare worker working in an environment of SARI patients; unusual or unexpected clinical course, especially sudden deterioration despite appropriate treatment; should be urgently investigated. Updated case definition need to be followed as per MOHFW, Govt of India which is available on the website www.mohfw.gov.in

Specimen collection details:

(Adapted from the WHO guidelines on 2019-nCoV):

Specimen type	Collection materials	Transport to laboratory	Storage till testing	Comment
Nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab	Dacron or polyester flocked swabs*	4 °C	≤5 days: 4 °C >5 days: -70 °C	The nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swabs should be placed in the same tube to increase the viral load.
Bronchoalveolar lavage	sterile container*	4 °C	≤48 hours: 4 °C >48 hours: –70 °C	There may be some dilution of pathogen, but still a worthwhile specimen
Tracheal aspirate, nasopharyngeal aspirate or nasal wash	sterile container*	4 °C	≤48 hours: 4 °C >48 hours: −70 °C	Not applicable
Sputum	sterile container	4 °C	≤48 hours: 4 °C >48 hours: –70 °C	Ensure the material is from the lower respiratory tract
Tissue from biopsy or autopsy including from lung	sterile container with saline	4 °C	≤24 hours: 4 °C >24 hours: −70 °C	Autopsy sample collection preferably to be avoided
Serum (2 samples – acute and convalescent)	Serum separator tubes (adults: collect 3-5 ml whole blood)	4 °C	≤5 days: 4 °C >5 days: –70 °C	Collect paired samples: • acute – first week of illness • convalescent – 2 to 3 weeks later

*For transport of samples for viral detection, use VTM (viral transport medium) containing antifungal and antibiotic supplements. Avoid repeated freezing and thawing of specimens.

Specimen labelling and processing:

- Personal protective equipment (apron, hand gloves, face shield, N95 Masks etc.) need to be used and all biosafety precautions should be followed so as to protect individuals and the environment.
- Proper labelling (name/age/gender/specimen ID) need to be done on specimen container and other details of sender (name/address/phone number) on the outer container by mentioning "To be tested for 2019-nCoV"
- For any queries, the nodal officer from ICMR-NIV Pune (Dr Yogesh K. Gurav, Scientist E) may be contacted (Phone 020-26006290/ 26006390; Email: gurav.yk@gmail.com/gurav.yk@gov.in) and need to be informed in advance before sending specimens to ICMR-NIV, Pune.



Specimen Collection, Packaging and Transport Guidelines for 2019 novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)

2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-NCOV) Requirements for Clinical Samples Collection, Packaging and Transport						
1. Sample vials and Virus Transport Medium (VTM)	2. Adsorbent material (cotton, tissue paper), paraffin, seizer, cello tape	3. A leak-proof seconda ziplock pouch, cryobo tube, plastic containe	ox, 50 mL centrifuge			
4. Hard-frozen Gel Packs	5. A suitable outer containe (minimum dimensions: 10 11 11 11 rocedure for Specimen Pack	0 x 10 x 10 cm)	e-box, hard-board box)			
1. Use PPE while handling	2. Seal the neck of the	3. Cover the sample vials	4. Arrange primary			
specimen	sample vials using parafilm	using absorbent material	container (vial) in secondary container			
5. Placing the centrifuge tube inside a zip-lock pouch	6. Placing the zip-lock pouch inside a sturdy plastic container and seal the neck of the container	Note: Sample vials can also be placed inside a zip-lock pouch, covered in absorbent material and secured by heat- sealing or rubber bands. Then, the zip-lock pouch should be placed inside another plastic pouch and secured	 Using a thermocol box as an outer container and placing the secondary container within it, surrounded by hard- frozen gel packs 			
7. Using a hard card-board box as an outer container and placing the secondary container and the gel packs Documents to accompany:	8. Placing the completed Specimen Referral Form (available on www.niv.co.in) and request letter inside a leak-proof, zip-lock pouch	9. Securing the zip-lock pouch with the Specimen Referral Form on the outer container	 10. Attaching the labels: Senders' address, contact number; Consignee's address /contactnumber; Biological substance- Category B; 'UN 3373'; Orientation label, Handle with care 			

equivalence document (for road/rail/sea transport) [Note: 1. A vaccine-carrier/ice-box can also be used as an outer container 2. The minimum dimensions of the outer container should be 10 x 10 x 10 cm (length x width x height)]

Routing of samples:

- Clinical specimens, official documents and Specimen request forms for testing of 2019-nCoV need to be sent to the ICMR-NIV address (The Director, ICMR-National Institute of Virology, 20-A, Dr Ambedkar Road, Pune, Maharashtra, Pin: 4110001).
- For shipment-related queries/information, kindly contact Dr Sumit Bharadwaj (Scientist B, Influenza Group) on email: sumitduttbhardwaj@gmail.com, phone 020-26006290/26006390

ICMR- National Institute of Virology, Pune Specimen Referral Form for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)

INCTRUCTIONS						
INSTRUCTIONS:						
	/ district / state health authorities, especially surveillance officer for further guidance	e.				
-	 Seek guidance on requirements for the clinical specimen collection and transport from nodal officer. This form may be filled in and shared with the IDSP and also ICMR-NIV nodal officer in advance. 					
PERSON DETAILS	e filled in and shared with the 1D51° and diso 1CMN-N1V houdi officer in davance.					
	Age:YrMonth Gender: Male Female					
•						
	Date of birth:/					
•	Mobile/phone:					
	Email:					
EXPOSURE HISTOR	Y (2 WEEKS BEFORE THE ONSET OF SYMPTOMS)					
	in area (Wuhan, China):Yes No If yes, stay/travel duration with date					
	et/seafood market: Yes 🗌 No 🗌 From:/ to:/					
Close contact with]				
Recent travel to an						
	working in hospital involved in managing patients YES / NO,					
•	e://///					
CLINICAL SYMPTO						
-	nptoms:// First symptom:					
Symptoms	Yes No Symptoms Yes No Symptoms Yes No Symptoms Yes No					
<u>Fever (</u> <7 days)	□ □ <u>Cough</u> □ □ □ Diarrhoea □ □ Abdominal pain □ □					
History of fever	□ □ <u>Breathlessness</u> □ □ Nausea □ □ Vomiting □ □					
(< 7 days)	Sore throat Body-ache Haemoptysis					
Chest pain	→ └ Sputum					
Signs	Yes No Sign Yes No Sign Yes No					
Wheeze	Stridor L Lower chest indrawing					
Nasal flaring	Crepitation L Accesary muscle use L L					
UNDERLYING MED						
Condition	es No Condition Yes No Condition Yes No Condition Yes No					
COPD	Bronchitis L Diabetes Hypertension L					
Chronic renal disea						
	MISED CONDITION: YES / NO Other:					
	TREATMENT AND INVESTIGATION					
	date:///	_				
DIFFERENTIAL DIA		_				
	ATION: YES / NO UNUSUAL / UNEXPECTED COURSE: YES / NO					
Outcome: Discharg						
Antibiotics		lo T				
Oxygen	CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP CPAP C					
	gs: Haematocrit:					
-	/te count: Lymphocytes (%): Monocytes (%): Neutrophils (%):					
	s: Chest X ray: Yes No , If yes (findings):					
	gs (If any):					
	details:					
SPECIMEN INFORMATION FROM REFERRING AGENCY						
Specimen type	Collection date Label FOR* Specimen ID Test performed Result					
1.	ICMR-					
2.	NIV					
Name of Doctor: Hospital Name/address:						
Phone/mobile nun	ber: Signature and date:					

PLEASE REFER THE REVERSE (PAGE 2) FOR CASE DEFINITION CHECKLIST TO BE CONSIDERED FOR SURVEILLANCE AND DIAGNOSIS. For any sharing of information or for any query, contact Dr. Yogesh Gurav Scientist E (020-26006290/26006390).

CASE DEFINITION

1. Severe Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI), with

presentation.

•	history of fever	YES / NO			
•	cough	YES / NO			
•	requiring admission to hospital	YES / NO			
WITH					
•	no other etiology explains the clinical presentation (clinicians should also be alert to the possibility of	YES / NO			
	atypical presentations in patients who are immunocomp	romised);			
AND					
any	y of the following				
٠	A history of travel to Wuhan, Hubei Province China				
	in the 14 days prior to symptom onset.	YES / NO			
•	the disease occurs in a health care worker				
	who has been working in an environment where patients	s with			
	severe acute respiratory infections are being cared for, v	vithout			
	regard to place of residence or history of travel	YES / NO			
•	• the person develops an unusual or unexpected clinical course,				
	especially sudden deterioration despite appropriate treatment,				
	without regard to place of residence or history of travel, even if				
	another etiology has been identified that fully explains the	clinical			

- YES /NO
- 2. Individuals with acute respiratory illness of any degree of severity who, within 14 days before onset of illness, had any of the following exposures:
 - close physical contact with a confirmed case of nCoV infection, while that patient was symptomatic;
 YES / NO
 - a healthcare facility in a country where hospital associated nCoV infections have been reported;
 YES / NO
 - direct contact with animals (if animal source is identified) in countries where the nCoV is known to be circulating in animal populations or where human infections have occurred as a result of presumed zoonotic transmission*.

* To be added once/if animal source is identified as a source of infection